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ABSTRACT
Accommodation, Decorum, and Disputatio: Matteo Ricci’s
The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven as a
Renaissance Humanist Disputation
Roberto Sebastian Leon
Department of English, BYU
Master of Arts
Matteo Ricci’s True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (1603) has been studied extensively
by scholars of the Jesuit China Mission, especially in terms of accommodation through means of
Scholastic and Humanist arguments and translation choices. Few of these studies, however,
discuss the genre of this work (disputation), nor consider this genre in relation to Renaissance
rhetorical teachings and how this relationship informs Ricci’s accommodative strategies. The
purpose of this paper is to remedy this gap in early modern Jesuit scholarship. Through a review
of the history of accommodations in disputations in the Aristotelian-Scholastic and CiceronianHumanist traditions, this paper claims that True Meaning is a Humanist disputation, not only
because Ricci translated Christian terms into Chinese and draws references from classical
sources, but also because this text follows strategies taught in the Humanist, but not the
Scholastic curriculum. If True Meaning is a Humanist disputation, then Ricci’s teachings
should be reconsidered from the perspective of Renaissance rhetoric, which sheds further light
on how Ricci’s work fits into Renaissance culture and the transformation of the early modern
disputation genre, as well as provides further explanation of the Western accommodation
paradigm Ricci brought to China, which is prior to understanding how Ricci was transformed by
China.

Keywords: Matteo Ricci, disputation, accommodation, Jesuit China Mission, rhetoric, decorum,
Humanism, Renaissance
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Introduction
Scholars agree that Matteo Ricci’s 天主實義 (Tiānzhǔ Shíyì) or The True Meaning of the
Lord of Heaven (1603) is a major text in the early modern Jesuit encounter with Late Ming China.1
Based on material from Ricci’s fellow missionaries and real discussions and debates between Ricci
and Chinese intellectuals, True Meaning outlines arguments designed to convert Chinese
Confucians to Christianity. These arguments show how Confucianism represents a natural step
towards Christianity by discussing subjects such as the nature of God, the nature of the soul, the
cultivation of virtue, and the customs of Catholic Europe. What is exceptionally unique about this
text is that Ricci makes his argument by referencing the Confucian canon rather than referencing
Christian scripture, citing Confucian texts about 86 times and the Bible only about 7 times.2
Scholarship into why Ricci used Confucian texts to support Christian doctrine has
focused on the issue of whether Ricci was influenced by an official Jesuit accommodation
strategy or by his experiences of trial and error. As outlined by Nicolas Standaert, a historian of
cultural contact between early modern China and Europe, the often discussed “Jesuit
accommodation strategy” that may have influenced Ricci consists of four strategies: 1)
adaptation to Chinese lifestyle and manners, such as Ricci’s adoption of Confucian robes and a
Chinese name; 2) “evangelization ‘from the top down,’” that is, seeking to convert government
officials before seeking to convert the lower classes, such as Ricci’s efforts to meet with the
Ming Emperor, Wanli; 3) indirect evangelizing by sharing European science and technology,
1 C.f. Hsia 239; Meynard, “Overlooked” 320; Schloesser 370.
2 See Meynard’s footnotes and index to the 2016 edition of True Meaning. The Confucian

canon consists of the Five Classics (Book of Songs, Book of Documents, Book of Rites, Book of
Changes, and Spring and Autumn Annals), supposedly collected by Confucius, and the Four
Books (Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects, and Mencius), all of which, with the
exception of Mencius, containing a record of the words of Confucius.
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such as Ricci’s Chinese translation, with his friend Xu Guangqi, of Euclid’s Elements; and 4)
“Openness to and tolerance of Chinese values,” such as Ricci’s apparently tolerant attitude
toward ancestor worship (“Corporate” 352-353).3 Standaert points out that these strategies have
generally been traced to “official Jesuit documents” (353). These documents include the
Spiritual Exercises (1548), a meditation manual; the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus (1553),
a collection of instructions and procedures for the governance of the Jesuit order; and various
letters from the early Jesuit fathers, all of which do not discuss accommodation in the context of
rhetoric. Similarly, these scholars who believe that Ricci came to China with a formal
accommodation method do not connect this method to rhetoric.
Of these scholars who discuss the origins of the accommodation strategy that Ricci
brought to China, only two have connected the strategy to rhetoric, and only one has discerned
this rhetorical accommodation strategy in Ricci’s True Meaning specifically. John O’Malley, a
historian of early modern religious culture and rhetoric, rather than naming strategies, suggests
that Jesuit accommodation practices are based on rhetoric. By rhetoric, O’Malley refers to the
ability to connect with an audience and mold self and message to the audience’s expectations:
“Essential to [successful oratory] was the orator’s ability to be in touch with the feelings and
needs of his audience and to adapt himself and his speech accordingly” (255). From the
Spiritual Exercises and other teachings influenced by Renaissance Humanism, O’Malley
suggests that “the Jesuits were constantly advised in all their ministries to adapt what they said
and did to times, circumstances, and persons” (255). He concludes that rhetoric, therefore, “was
a basic principle in all their ministries, even if they did not explicitly identify it as rhetorical”
(255). Of Ricci, O’Malley says that it was more than wearing Chinese robes that revealed
3 See also Von Collani, “Missionizing” 49; Harris 158-159; Muller 461; Sebes 42. For general

mentions of accommodation in Ricci that do not follow this partition, see Cevera 220, Mungello
15, and Prieto 396-7.
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accommodative practices. Rather, Ricci and the Chinese Jesuits “carried their pastoral principle
of accommodation to times, places, and circumstances to its utmost expression” (342). While
O’Malley recognizes aspects of rhetoric at play in Jesuit practices, he does not study
accommodation in True Meaning specifically.
Stephen Schloesser, a historian of Jesuit history, does connect rhetoric to True Meaning,
but does so using O’Malley’s definitions of rhetoric and adaptation. Schloesser calls the Jesuit
accommodation practice the Jesuit “rhetorical principle,” which, “Opposing. . . essentialist and
universalist values prized by certain strands of medieval scholasticism descended from
Aristotle, . . . privileged the thoroughly contingent here-and-now” (348). Hence he calls True
Meaning a “radically ‘rhetorical’ piece. . . because [Ricci] adapted to his audience in a shrewdly
accommodating way” (370). Schloesser’s “shrewd accommodation” refers to Ricci’s “attitude
toward his translation” of the Four Books of Confucianism from Classical Chinese to Latin and
back to Classical Chinese in an effort to identify references to a monotheism and rebuttals to
Buddhist anti-Christian arguments; Schloesser says nothing, however, about other adaptations to
times, circumstances, and persons (367). Both O’Malley and Schloesser treat of rhetoric only in
the general sense of communication that is tailored to an audience.
Other scholars reject that the Jesuits brought an accommodation strategy to China and
instead suggest that the Jesuits and Ricci invented accommodation strategies in response to
cultural exigencies of Chinese political culture. Eric Zürcher, a historian of Chinese Buddhism,
explains that other minority, non-native religions in China, such as Judaism, Islam, and
Buddhism, had to conform to a “‘cultural imperative’” that religious teachings should accord
with the orthodoxy of Confucianism or be dismissed as dangerously heterodox: “no marginal
religion penetrating from the outside could expect to take root in China (at least at that social
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level) unless it conformed to that pattern” (“Accommodation” 40-41). Zürcher then concludes
that Ricci learned about this “cultural imperative” gradually, rather than from the beginning: “he
must only gradually have realized, with a rare combination of intelligence, intuition, and a
growing knowledge of the Chinese situation, that this was the only viable way” (41). Standaert
and others are of the same opinion (“Corporate” 356-357).4 Scholars who emphasize the trialand-error approach also do not discuss their claim in the context of rhetoric.
Another issue in Ricci scholarship has been the identification of Ricci’s source material.
Some scholars consider True Meaning a Scholastic text because Ricci uses AristotelianScholastic terminology and because he draws arguments from the Scholastic theologian St.
Thomas Aquinas. These scholars consider the presence of Aristotelian terms translated into
Chinese and argumentation strategies to be indicative of Scholastic thought. Joachim Kurtz, a
professor of intellectual history, in the process of tracing the introduction of Western logic to
China, points out that Ricci was trained using logical textbooks from Francisco de Toledo and
Pedro Da Fonseca, which are commonly considered Scholastic textbooks (25).5 Because of this
training in logic, Ricci includes terms such as Substance and Accident (32), the Four Causes, and
the Universal and Particular in True Meaning (30-31).6 The sinologist Jacques Gernet believes
that Ricci is essentially teaching the Chinese scholastic philosophy through these terms: “Ricci
does in effect attempt to teach the Chinese to reason in accordance with the rules of scholastic
philosophy. . . . Ricci makes use of the entire logical apparatus inherited from classical Antiquity
and medieval scholasticism” (243).

4 See Harris 156; Rule 11; Sebes 38.

5 For references to Toledo and Fonseca as Scholastic philosophers, see Knuuttila 249;
Nuchelmans 8, 34; Brady and Gurr 765-766.
6 See also Bettray 193; Hsia 226, 228; Rule 33; Shen 64; Wiest 40.
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Scholars who identify Scholastic material in True Meaning also concentrate on Ricci’s
use of arguments from Thomistic theology. Standaert simply states that Ricci frequently cites
material from Thomistic theology: "These writings were primarily based on the works of
Thomistic theology as the missionaries had been taught these in their formation" (“Jesuits” 181).
Mary Laven, another historian of early modern Europe, is similarly brief, referring to Thomistic
analogies rather than theology: “Drawing on the traditional arguments of Catholic theology-especially the thirteenth-century writings of Thomas Aquinas-- Ricci made extensive use of vivid
analogies in order to persuade his readers of the truth of these Christian persuasions" (201). The
philosopher Thierry Meynard, in his footnotes to the 2016 edition of True Meaning, suggests that
Ricci cites Aquinas 52 times for theological arguments and analogies. An example of a
Thomistic theological argument can be found, as Meynard suggests, when Ricci says that
“phenomena cannot come into being of themselves” (1.34), echoing the Summa Theologica:
“There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the
efficient cause of itself” (Ia, q.2, a. 3). The philosopher Vincent Shen also recognizes the
Thomist arguments in this section: “A great part of his proofs came from St. Thomas’ quinque
viae, the five ways” of proving the existence of God (61). Ricci is also considered Thomistic in
regards to his choice to argue from natural reason. The historian Joan-Pau Rubiés refers to
Aquinas’ approach to Christianity in Summa contra Gentiles, in which Aquinas claims that
Christianity is more rational than Judaism and Islam, as precedent for Ricci’s choices to argue
from natural reason (259-260). The early Jesuits in China, Rubiés concludes, based their rational
approach to faith on “the Thomistic assumption that rationality, the pre-requisite for an orderly,
sophisticated, and prosperous social life in Renaissance thinking . . . was the best basis upon
which Christianity could rest” (263).7
7 See also Lancashire, Kuo-Chen, and Meynard 6; Meynard, “Overlooked” 304 (and footnote 1);
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Other scholars consider True Meaning a Humanistic text because of either Ricci’s
method of translating Christian terms into Chinese, or of Ricci’s method of referencing Western
classical literature. Some note the references without classifying the work as Humanist.
Scholars, however, do identify similarities between Ricci’s Christianization of Confucian terms
and the Humanists’ Christianization of Roman and Greek concepts. By way of example, the
historians Howard Goodman and Anthony Grafton find the Christianization of texts to be a
prevalent practice among Humanists, citing Justus Lipsius’ De Constantia (1583), which showed
how Stoic teachings complemented Christian teachings, and they suggest that Ricci was trained
in such practices (103-106).8 Goodman and Grafton then continue this focus on translation by
showing how this practice applies to Ricci’s well-documented choice to use the Confucian terms
Shangdi (“Sovereign on High”) and Tianzhu (“Lord of Heaven”) to translate Deus or God (108114).9 By selecting these terms for translation, Ricci draws obvious connections between these
two schools of thought.
Scholars also consider Ricci’s references to Western classical literature an indication of
Humanist thought. In his footnotes to True Meaning, Meynard notes that Ricci cites about 12
classical authors, including Aesop, Cicero, Diogenes the Cynic, Diogenes Laertius, Empedocles,
Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius, Pliny the Elder, Plutarch, Seneca, and Plato. A comparative
literature scholar, Sher-Shiueh Li, and Meyanrd, have investigated Ricci’s use of these authors as
the rhetorical strategy of arguing from example (Li and Meynard 13).10 Only one scholar,
however, has suggested that True Meaning is a Humanist text because of these references.
Patrick Provost-Smith, a professor of intellectual history and critical theory, considers True
and Rule, “Chinese” 109.
8 See also Meynard, “Overlooked” 311, 319; Poli 181; Schloesser 367; Spalatin 71.
9 See also Cassady 9; Cawley 299-301; Kim 1; Lancashire, Kuo-Chen, and Meynard 18-22; Wu
128-162.
10 See also Li 40-44.
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Meaning Humanistic rather than Scholastic because he believes that Scholastics would not cite
or consider translating from classical literature (49). In the context of Ricci’s other works,
scholars, such as Goodman and Grafton, also seem to be of the opinion that the Humanists are
marked for their use of classical literature (102).11 While scholars consider Ricci’s Humanist
and Scholastic source material, and in the case of Li and Meynard, consider how these sources
might be used rhetorically, they do not consider other ways in which Ricci’s work has been
shaped by rhetoric.
A sub-issue in determining whether True Meaning is a Scholastic or a Humanist text is
the genre. Scholars who believe the genre is Scholastic focus on Ricci’s argumentation, while at
the same time scholars note incompatibilities between Scholastic argumentation and the apparent
Humanist dialogue genre of True Meaning.12 The historian Jean-Paul Wiest recognizes both
Ricci’s “western logic, codified in the rigid laws of scholastic argumentation” in True Meaning
and Ricci’s usually non-confrontational mien, since he “placed great emphasis on harmonious
relationships” (40). David Mungello, another historian, also recognizes Ricci’s “Scholastic
deductive logic” on the one hand and Ricci’s “Humanist emphasis on compositional structure
and rhetorical persuasion” on the other (28). Because of Ricci’s structure, Mungello concludes
that True Meaning is a Humanist Platonic dialogue comparable to Galileo’s Dialogo sopra i due
massimi del mondo (1632) (28). Mungello probably believes that True Meaning is a Humanist
Platonic dialogue because in his estimation any dialogue must be a Platonic dialogue, since, as
he understands history, such dialogues are “a favored literary form for argumentative
presentations” for Renaissance Humanists (28). Schloesser similarly compares True Meaning to

11 Maryks, “Principle” 87, 91, 97; Modras 109; Spalatin 71; Standaert “Renaissance” 370, 377;

Zürcher, “Rhetoric” 334.
12 It is also assumed that missionaries before Ricci relied more on Scholastic argumentation than
Chinese texts as Ricci did. See Von Collani “Accommodation” 25.
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Humanist dialogues, saying that True Meaning is written in the “Platonic dialogue form
reminiscent of Erasmus’s The Godly Feast (Convivium religiosum, 1522)” (368). Schloesser
likely classifies True Meaning in this way because The Godly Feast contains multiple
interlocutors and a discussion between adherents of different religions, some of whom praise
non-Christians, such as Cicero, for teaching truth, similar to how Ricci praises non-Christians,
such as Confucius. Provost-Smith similarly assumes that the dialogue genre is typical of
Humanists, and says that True Meaning is Humanistic because it is written in the dialogue genre
instead of the Scholastic quaestio genre that is composed of a series of questions and answers
(49).
Wiest, Mungello, Schloesser, and Provost-Smith, however, overlook the genre Ricci had
in mind. As mentioned earlier, Ricci gives two subtitles in his Latin summary of True Meaning
which define the intended genre. When True Meaning was published in Beijing, Ricci sent a
Latin summary of the Mandarin text to the Father General of the Jesuit order in Rome, in which
he gave True Meaning two titles: Catechismus Sinicus and De Deo verax Disputatio. True
Meaning was originally intended to be a Catechismus-- a catechism, as Ricci was tasked to
revise the catechism of his predecessor, Michele Ruggieri.13 Laven believes that this title means
that Ricci’s work is comparable to other catechisms, such as that of Peter Canisius, which were
used for polemical purposes (203-204). While Ricci did in fact set out to write a catechism of
that sort, Ricci’s final work is a richer disputatio, which includes not only exposition but also
extended exchanges between interlocutors. As Ricci’s translators, Douglas Lancashire and Peter
Hu Kuo-chen note in their introduction to True Meaning, Ricci’s final work is much more

13 天主聖教實錄 (Tiānzhǔ Shèngjiào Shílù) or Vera et brevis divinarum rerum expositio
(1584). See Gernet 17; Rule 11.
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“philosophical-theological” than a catechism (30). Ricci’s second title, therefore, is more
significant: True Meaning is a disputatio, a disputation.
Only Paul Rule, an Australian sinologist, has recognized that True Meaning is a
disputation. Unfortunately, Rule only considers a disputation “an argument about matters of
religion” (33). Disputation, however, is more than a religious argument. Rather, disputation is a
specific genre of Scholastic debate. As Paul Grendler, a historian of the Italian Renaissance,
defines it, a disputation is “a formal debate” in which “Two or more disputants argue[] according
to Aristotelian principles of argumentation for and against various propositions in order to arrive
at the truth” (152-153).14 Jonathan Spence, a professor of Chinese history, in his oft-cited
Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci, explains that Ricci was trained in this type of debate. Spence
even connects this training in disputation to preparation for missionary service: “The Jesuits
were probably trained as well as anyone in the world at the time for mission service overseas”
due to their training in Scholastic disputations, which “gave extraordinary training. . . in
structuring argument, [and in] analyzing their own faith” (100). While True Meaning is a
disputation, Ricci scholars have yet to explain why True Meaning contains both Scholastic and
Humanist elements.
Although scholars have identified both Scholastic and Humanist sources for Ricci’s
arguments and translation choices, their concentration on arguments has led to the neglect of the
question of the genre of True Meaning, which would serve to further classify this text. These
oversights are due to an inadequate understanding of the distinctions between the Scholastic and
Humanist curricula. Because of this deficient understanding, Ricci scholars have not been able
to see that the accommodation strategy Ricci uses descends from the teachings of the Christian
Humanists, not the Scholastics, making True Meaning a Humanist disputation and not a
14 See also Murphy 102.
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Scholastic disputation. In this paper, I claim that Ricci’s True Meaning is a Humanist
disputation, not only because Ricci translated Christian terms into Chinese and draws references
from classical sources, but also because this text follows strategies taught in the Humanist, but
not the Scholastic curriculum. If True Meaning is a Humanist disputation, then Ricci’s teachings
should be reconsidered from the perspective of Renaissance rhetoric, which sheds further light
on how Ricci’s work fits into Renaissance culture and the transformation of the disputation
genre, as well as provides further explanation of the Western accommodation paradigm Ricci
brought to China. An understanding of this paradigm is prior to understanding how Ricci was
transformed by China.
In order to show that Ricci’s understanding of disputation in True Meaning is Humanist
rather than Scholastic, I will first outline a history of the theory of respectful discourse in
Scholastic disputation from its roots in Aristotle to its development by the Scholastics. Second, I
will outline a history of the theory of respectful discourse or decorum in Christian Humanist
rhetoric from its roots in Cicero to its development by the Humanists and the Jesuits. Third, I
will analyze Ricci’s own theory of respectful discourse in relation to these two traditions.

Aristotle and the Scholastics
The Scholastics derive their understanding of disputation from Aristotle’s teachings on
logic and dialectic, wherein is found a limited theory of respectful discourse. As is well
understood, Aristotle teaches that logic and dialectic are distinct forms of argumentation. He
defines logic (“apódeixis”) as argumentation (“syllogismós” or “logós”) which proceeds from
“primary and true” premises, and dialectic (“dialektikòs”) as argumentation which proceeds from
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“generally accepted opinions” (Topica I.1.100b17-18).15 Because these disciplines are distinct
in Aristotle’s mind, he provides different guidelines of courtesy for each. In a logical discussion
or
demonstration, the way to appropriate discourse for the philosopher should not be concerned
with how an interlocutor responds, but rather with being as clear and truthful as possible: “the
philosopher and individual seeker does not care if. . . the answerer refuses to admit” the premises
and “indeed the philosopher may perhaps even be eager that his axioms should be as familiar and
as near the starting-point as possible” (Topica VIII.1.155b10-16). Because demonstration
proceeds from “primary and true” premises (Topica I.1.100a25-30) and is “didactic”
(“didaskalikoì” [On Sophistical Refutations 2.165b2]), it is by nature appropriate and, as
Aristotle says in On Rhetoric, “persuasive” (I.1.1355a12).16 Dialectic, however, does concern
itself with how an interlocutor responds or does not respond appropriately to organized
argumentation: the “arrangement of material and the framing of questions are the peculiar
province of the dialectician; for such a proceeding always involves a relation with another party”
(VIII.1.155b8-10).
Aristotle gives one general guideline for dialectic: disputants should have a common
purpose. Marta Spranzi, a scholar of the history and philosophy of science, emphasizes
Aristotle’s rule for governing dialectic: disputants should have a “‘common task (‘koinon ergon’
(161a22))’” or “‘a common purpose (‘koinon prokeimenon’)’ (161a38-39)” (Spranzi 29).
Spranzi paraphrases Aristotle’s three purposes of dialectic outlined in Topica I.101a25-101b4—
“mental training (‘gymnasia’), conversation (enteuxis’), and the ‘philosophical sciences (‘kata
philosophian epistemeis’)’” – and highlights this third “epistemic function of dialectic” (19).
Olga Weijers, an expert on the history of disputation, also understands the common purpose of
15 See also Sophistical Refutations II.165b2-3, Topica I.14.105b30-34.

16 Weijers is also of the opinion that demonstration in Topica and didactic arguments in On
Sophistical Refutations are synonymous concepts (Disputation Techniques 77).

Leon 12
dialectical disputation to essentially be “the genuine, shared effort to reach the truth” (Teaching
and Debating 125). With this tacit agreement to put truth first, the interlocutors dispute
according to procedures which focus on misleading the answerer in the disputation. The
questioner’s purpose, Aristotle explains, is to lead the answerer into “giv[ing] the most
paradoxical replies that necessarily result because of the thesis,” whereas the answerer’s purpose
is to avoid falling into this trap by “mak[ing] it seem that the impossible or paradoxical is not his
fault but is due to the thesis” (Topica VIII.4.159a19-23).17 Various strategies to accomplish this
misdirection include “conceal[ing] the conclusion” (VIII.1.155b21-28), “leav[ing the argument]
obscure” (VIII.1.156b6-9), “prolong[ing] the argument and. . . introduc[ing] into it points which
are of no worth” (VIII.1.157a2-4).18 The disputant who answers questions will ideally “concede
all points which are generally accepted and all those not generally accepted which are less
generally rejected than the conclusion aimed at” (VIII.5.159b16-17). Also, the disputant who
asks questions will not become upset with the process of disputation and thereby transform the
disputation from a dialectical disputation to a contentious disputation (VIII.11.161a23-25).19
The audience in a disputation will be two dialecticians, with perhaps a difference in authority
because one dialectician will teach the other: “It is clear, then, that a mere questioner and a man
who is imparting knowledge have not the same right to claim an admission” (VIII.4.159a13-14).
According to Aristotle, by concentrating on purpose and method, one will participate in a good
disputation.
The Scholastic dialecticians continue to follow Aristotle’s division of logic and dialectic,
but see logical demonstration as a kind of disputation rather than just a different form of

17 See also VIII.1.155b21-28; Kneale and Kneale 300; Stump, “Dialectic” 161; Novikoff,

Medieval Culture 117.
18 See also VIII.1.156b4-5; VIII.1.156b19; VIII.1.156b23-24; VIII.1.157a7-8.
19 See also On Sophistical Refutations 11.171b21-30.
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argumentation. Early Scholastics in the Middle Ages, such as John of Salisbury and Peter of
Spain, follow Aristotle’s division of logic and dialectic. In Metalogicon (1159), a defense of the
liberal arts, John explains that demonstration functions regardless of an audience because it
teaches truth. Therefore, John implicitly agrees with Aristotle’s rules for demonstration:
It rejoices in necessity. It does not pay much attention to what various people
think about a given proposition. Its sole concern is that a thing must be so. It thus
befits the philosophical majesty of those who teach the truth, a majesty which is a
result of its own conviction. . . , and independent of the assent of listeners. (79)
Dialectical disputation, however, proceeds from generally accepted opinions and seeks rather
than teaches truth; it is “concerned with propositions which, to all or to many men, or at least to
the wise, seem to be valid. . . . it makes inquiry into the truth” (79). Peter of Spain, in his
Summulae Logicales (c.1230), keeps logic and dialectic separate as well, but also makes logical
demonstration a kind of disputation: “There are four kinds of disputation: didactic, dialectical,
tentative (examination-arguments) and sophistical (contentious)” (77).20 This list, Weijers
explains, is “derived from” Aristotle’s teachings in On Sophistical Refutations (77). Aristotle
writes that logical demonstration and dialectical disputation are both kinds of “arguments used in
discussion” (“dialégesthai lógōn” [2.165b2]) (77). The philosopher Boethius (c. 480–524) also
writes that demonstration and dialectic are kinds of disputations: “disputation progresses by
means of true and necessary arguments (this is called a discipline and demonstration)” (In
Ciceronis Topica, 2.6-2.7).21

20 “Disputationis autem quatuor sunt species. Alia namque est doctrinalis, alia dialetica, alia
temptativa, alia sophistica” (De Rijk 90, VII.4)
21 “. . . aut enim ueris ac necessariis argumentationibus disputatio decurrit & disciplina, uel
demonstratio nuncupatur” (“Topica” 760)
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Regarding dialectic, the early Scholastics accept Aristotle’s common purpose rule for
dialectical disputation, add more rules, and transform some of Aristotle’s disputation methods.
Peter Abelard, in Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew, and a Christian (c.1136-1139), asserts
that if there is an “agreement and mutual consent” and all interlocutors involved will work
together to pursue truth, then “there is no disputation so frivolous that it does not contain some
instructive lesson” (23).22 John of Salisbury writes that one should check improper disputation
by going back to Aristotle’s teachings on how to conduct an appropriate disputation: “The excess
of those who think dialectical discussion consists in unbridled loquacity should have been
restrained by Aristotle” (92). John also adds the following rules for dialectical disputation:
1) Disputation should be kept within the proper limits so as to preserve the
teaching aspect of the practice (“once we go beyond the proper limits, everything
works in reverse, and excessive subtlety devours utility” [90]).
2) Disputation should not become an end unto itself (“‘Nothing is more disgusting
than subtlety by [itself] and for itself’” [90]).
3) Disputation should be moderate (“checked by the reins of moderation”
[92]).23 Similarly, the theologian Robert Goulet, in his Compendium (1517) or introduction to
the University of Paris, recommends Peter of Spain’s Summulae Logicales, the commentaries of
the medieval logician George of Brussels, the Renaissance Aristotelian Jacques Lefèvre
d'Étaples, and the Renaissance logician John Mair (110). According to Ricardo García
Villoslada, Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit order, would have been trained using
these texts (307). Goulet adds five rules which for the most part implicitly reaffirm Aristotle’s
common search for truth and contradict Aristotle’s rules for trickery:
22 “Quia tamen hoc ex condicto, et pari statuistis consensu. . . et nullam adeo frivolam
disputationem arbitror, ut non aliquod habeat documentum” (“Dialogus” 1614).
23 See also Novikoff Medieval Culture 110.
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1) one should not use dialectic “as an end in itself” (96)
2) one should not seek to “vanquish [one’s] opponent in an argument” (96)
3) one should not use “the audacity of clamorous words” (96)
4) one should not be given to “excessive argumentation” (96), and
5) one should not “employ in obscuring and hiding the truth the very instrument
formed to aid it” (96).
Other Scholastics also add rules for a new role, that of the praeses or professor tasked
with regulating disputations. Eleonore Stump, a historian of medieval philosophy, suggests that
there may be some indication of the presence of others besides the questioner and answerer in
Aristotle’s Topica. In her notes to Boethius’ De Topicis Differentiis, Stump lists Topica 158a811, 161b16-18, 162a8-9, and 162b16-18 as indications of her belief that others are represented in
Aristotle’s conception of the roles in a disputation (164). However, only 161b16-18 clearly
suggests that there may be multiple questioners: “the questioners and the arguments are not open
to the same kind of criticism.” While the inclusion of praeses has some precedent in Aristotle,
later dialecticians develop the role further. In his influential doctoral dissertation on disputations
from the 1550s to the 1750s, Donald Felipe explains that some Renaissance dialecticians,
including Johannes Felwinger, Rudolphus Goclenius, Joachim Langius, Robert Sanderson,
Johannes Schneider, Bartholomaeus Keckermann, and Clement Timpler, also add rules for
praeses or heads. Many of these dialecticians write specifically about the obligational
disputation. As Weijers notes, the obligational disputation, in which disputants tested the
validity of a statement, followed the same procedure as Aristotle’s dialectical disputation: “each
participant tried to induce the other to contradict himself” (Disputation Techniques 77). Weijers
also explains that these kinds of disputation are derivatives of Aristotle’s dialectical disputations
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(77-78). The duties of the praeses are to ensure that the disputation remains a learning tool by
teaching, moderating, commenting on, and concluding the disputed argument:
(1) pedagogical duties, i.e. duties to inform and teach the participants and auditors of
the disputation.
(2) duties of “moderating”: these duties are of two kinds, to keep “order” in the
disputation, i.e., to prevent the disputation into extraneous matters, and to prevent
provocation of anger and ill-will.
(3) duties of responding and opposing, i.e. duties to help the Respondent and
Opponent with arguments and responses.
(4) duties to conclude, i.e. duties to bring the disputation to some kind of conclusion
(Felipe 185)
Though not always uniform from one dialectician to the next, Renaissance dialecticians continue
to develop rules to provide more direction on how a disputation should ideally be conducted.
These rules for appropriate disputation may come in response to abuses that the
Scholastics see in disputation techniques. Abelard, for example, is well-known for taking
dialectic to extremes. Alex Novikoff, an expert on Renaissance of the 12th Century and
disputation culture, point out that Abelard is known for using public disputation as a means of
humiliating those who distrusted him, rather than of leading others to see eye to eye with him
(“Abelard” 324-325, 328). The medievalist Andrew Taylor also notes that “Abelard and his
contemporaries repeatedly describe their debates in military terms, as clashes of arms, conflicts,
or battles, often developing the metaphor at length” (16).24 Taylor goes on to cite as evidences
for the violent nature of dialectic St. Bernard’s description of Abelard as a Goliath (16) and
Abelard’s description of his own encounter with William of Champeaux as a “siege” (17).
24 See also Novikoff Medieval Culture 112.
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Weijers remarks that this “degree of verbal violence” and also “vehement criticism,” in which,
for example, “the adversary is explicitly mentioned and treated with a lack of respect,” was
common (Teaching and Debating 124).25 As is well known, John of Salisbury departed from
Abelard on this matter, as the medieval historian Sir Richard W. Southern explains: he “fled
from the contentious logic-chopping of Abelard’s pupils” (19).26 John singles out a tendency in
Scholastic dialectic to turn to unimportant matters as consequence of the temptation to focus on
winning. John speaks against those who “are haranguing at the crossroads, and are teaching in
public pleaces [sic], and who have worn away, not merely ten or twenty years, but their whole
life with logic as their sole concern.” These are people who “meticulously sift every syllable,
yea every letter, of what has been said and written, doubting everything, ‘forever studying, but
never acquiring knowledge.’ At length ‘they turn to babbling utter nonsense,’ and, at a loss as to
what to say, or out of lack of a thesis, relieve their embarrassment by proposing new errors”
(Metalogicon 88-89). To prevent these issues of haranguing, scrutinizing, and babbling, John
and other Scholastics reiterate Aristotle’s common purpose rule by emphasizing the ends of
disputation, add other rules for the regulation of disputation— such as avoiding loud speaking
and obfuscation— and create new disputation methods— such as the development of the role of
the praeses— to develop a theory of how respectful disputation ought to proceed.

Cicero and the Humanists
The Humanists, as opposed to the Scholastics, derive their understanding of the
philosophical dialogue genre from Cicero’s teachings on philosophy and rhetoric-- teachings
which specify a theory of respectful discourse that is much more developed than that of the

25 See also Disputation Techniques 146-147.
26 See also Taylor 22; Kneale and Kneale 225-226.
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Scholastics because it accounts for more aspects of the speech situation in which a disputation
occurs. Scholars widely recognize, as historian of Renaissance rhetoric Nancy Christiansen
explains, that in Cicero’s teachings “the arts of logic and dialectic have been conflated and
subordinated to rhetoric” (93).27 For example, in Orator, Cicero cites Aristotle’s note that
rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic (On Rhetoric I.1.1354a1), but adds that this means that
rhetoric encompasses dialectic: “the difference obviously being that rhetoric was broader and
logic narrower” (32.114). In Tusculan Disputations, Cicero explains that he considers an art
which adds rhetoric to philosophy to be most complete: “it has ever been my conviction that
philosophy in its finished form [(perfectam philosophiam)] enjoys the power of treating the
greatest problems with adequate fullness and in an attractive style [(copiose posset ornateque
dicere)]” (1.4.7). Furthermore, Cicero writes in On Ends that there is indeed a rhetoric for
philosophical discussions. Cicero’s friend Torquatus, defending Epicureanism, claims to prefer
rhetorical “continuous discourse [(perpetua oratio)],” and dismisses dialectic as “logic-chopping
and quibbling [(dialecticas captiones)]” (2.6.17). Cicero responds that he will speak in a
rhetorical manner, but specifically using the “rhetoric of the philosophers [(rhetorica
philosophorum)], not the sort which we use in the law-courts” (2.6.17). In defining this kind of
rhetoric, Cicero blurs the division between philosophy and rhetoric. This “union of philosophy
and rhetoric,” as Walter Nicgorski, an expert in Cicero and political philosophy, puts it, is what
scholars refer to as Cicero’s perfecta philosophia (73).28 This perfecta philosophia is discussed
in relation to Cicero’s sermo, a conversation that combines both philosophical and rhetorical
genres into a form Nicgorski calls a “philosophical rhetoric” that replaces disputatio with sermo

27 See also Novikoff, Medieval Culture 14; Weijers, Disputation Techniques 27.
28 See also 74-82; Schofield 70-72.
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(90 note 47).29 Gallus Zoll, for example, points to instances where Cicero uses sermo and
disputatio together in his Letters to Atticus (“a frank talk [(sermone ac disputatione)]” [1.17])
and in De Oratore (“conversations and discussions” [2.19]) as synonyms for the Greek diálogos,
blurring the distinctions between these genres: “he soon translates [diálogos] to sermo,
sometimes to disputatio” (49).30
Because Cicero sees philosophy and rhetoric as united and as the same genre (sermo), he
lays out a theory of respectful discourse that applies to both disciplines. Cicero makes his claim
that the rules that govern rhetoric should also govern philosophical discussions: “the same rules
that we have for words and sentences in rhetoric will apply also to conversation” (On Duties
1.37.132). The main guiding principle for the rules of rhetoric is decorum or propriety-- “what is
fitting and agreeable to an occasion or person” which is important “in actions as well as in
words” for poets, painters, actors, and orators (Orator 22.74). Cicero provides an explicit theory
of respectful discourse in the concept of decorum.31 Cicero sees decorum as positioning oneself
in accordance with the natural order of the universe. In On the Ideal Orator, Cicero expresses
his belief that “all the universe above and below us is a unity and is bound together by a single,
natural force and harmony. . . . there is nothing in the world, of whatever sort, that can exist on
its own severed from all other things” (3.20). In On Duties, he explains that the perception and
pursuit of this unity are inherent in man: “it is no mean manifestation of Nature and Reason that
man is the only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for moderation. . . . beauty,
loveliness, harmony. . . [and] consistency” (1.4.14). Indeed, in Cicero’s myth of the dawn of

29 See Remer 28 (especially notes 96-98) and Fantham 50 (note 2) for further discussion

regarding the relationship of the Latin sermo and disputatio to the Greek dialogo. Remer also
cites On Ends 2.6.17 and Tusculan Disputations 1.47.112 as evidence that Cicero describes a
“‘rhetoric of the philosophers’” (27).
30 “sondern er übersetzt [διάλογος] bald mit sermo, bald mit disputatio"
31 See Hariman 204; Christiansen 94.
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civilization, men become civilized as they move toward an “ordered system of religious
worship. . . [or] of social duties” (On Invention 1.2.2).32 Also, this truth is recognized by all
people because it is pleasing (“that very quality we term moral goodness and propriety is
pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our hearts” [On Duties 2.9.32]) and will be
recognized by both the layman and the expert (“the orator who is approved by the multitude must
inevitably be approved by the expert. . . . there can never be disagreement between experts and
the common people” [Brutus 49.184-185]).33 Also, persuasion is preferable to force: “there are
two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and since the
former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we
may not avail ourselves of discussion” (On Duties 1.11.34).34
Because this pursuit of propriety and harmony are inherent in Nature and human nature,
attention to circumstances become essential to understanding what is appropriate. Indeed,
“someone who does not understand what the occasion demands” is not exercising decorum (On
the Ideal Orator 2.17). This occasion includes cultural circumstances: “we must be familiar with
[the country’s] spirit, its customs, [and] its traditional order and morals” (1.196). One should
also consider the status and desires of an audience: “take[]. . . account of the standing or the
interests of those whose company he is in” (2.17).35 This consideration will ensure that
courtesies are applied “with due consideration to the company present” (On Duties 1.37.135) and
will make the conversation proceed smoothly: “It should be easy and not in the least
dogmatic. . . . should not debar others from participating in it, as if he were entering upon a
private monopoly” (1.37.134); the conversation should proceed with “the greatest care to show

32 See also On Duties 1.28.100, 1.40.144, 3.5.25.
33 See also Christiansen 95; Kapust 99-100.
34 See also Remer 46.
35 See also On the Ideal Orator 3.211.
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courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse” (1.38.136). The
circumstances suggest what is best to say in a given situation in order to achieve social harmony.
Attention to these aspects of one’s environment also acts as a guide to determining the
best way to adapt one’s behavior to new social situations. For example, since “no single style is
fitting for every case or every audience or every person involved or every occasion” because
each case, audience, person, and occasion is unique (On the Ideal Orator 3.210), one should look
to these aspects of a situation to know what is appropriate for that situation.36 In other words, the
speaker must seek in all ways possible to accommodate both truth and the situation: “adapt
[(accomodanda)] one’s discourse to conform not only with the truth but also with the opinions of
one’s hearers” (Divisions of Oratory 25.90).37 By adapting one’s discourse in this way, Cicero
asserts that the speaker “show[s] what I may almost call reverence toward all men-- not only
toward the men who are the best, but toward others as well” (On Duties 1.28.99).
Like Cicero, the Humanist rhetoricians dissolve the distinctions between logic, dialectic,
and rhetoric. The philosopher Gabriel Nuchelmans, among others, notes that the Humanists see
logic and dialectic as essentially the same discipline (182-183).38 For example, in his logic
textbook The Rule of Reason (1551), the English Protestant Thomas Wilson, says logic and
dialectic “are bothe one” (10). Also, the Humanists see logic as being closely tied to rhetoric
because they follow Cicero’s teachings (143).39 For example, in The Arte of Rhetorique (1560),
Wilson cites Cicero to explain that the rhetorician, who focuses on the particular, must know
logic, which teaches the universal: “And yet, notwithstanding Tullie doth say, that whosoeuer

36 See also Orator 35.123- 36.123; Divisions of Oratory 5.15; On Duties 1.28.98;
Christiansen 178; Baumlin 142. See Eden 17 (especially note 19) for further history of these
circumstances (occasion, places, persons) in the history of rhetoric in general.
37 See also Orator 8.4; Rhetorica ad Herennium 9.17.
38 See also Ashworth 22; Green 72-73; Guerlac 20, 31.
39 See also Christiansen 107-108.
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will talke of particuler matter must remember, that within the same also is comprehended a
generall” (2). Christiansen explains at length that many Humanist rhetoricians, such as Valla,
Trebizond, Vives, Erasmus, Day, Melanchthon, Rainolds, Wilson, Soarez, Fenner, Puttenham,
Scaliger, Lamy, Robertellus, Peacham, Hoskins, Granada, Sturm, and Elyot, apply rhetoric
across all genres of discourse (101-104). For example, Heinrich Plett cites Melanchthon’s
addition of a fourth genre to the traditional trio of epideictic, deliberative, and judicial: didactic,
usually considered a part of logic: “‘The didactic or instructive genre shows the method of
handling all topics other people have to be taught’” (22).40 The blurring of the distinctions
between logic, dialectic, and rhetoric lead the Humanist rhetoricians to consider disputation
through the lens of decorum.
The Humanists ascribe to Cicero’s theory of respectful discourse or decorum and add a
Christian element to Cicero’s teachings. Wilson explains that Nature is congruous with God’s
order. In providing his version of Cicero’s myth of the beginning of civilization, Wilson says
that God persuades “all men to societie” and “to all good order” (Arte of Rhetorique xliv).
Desiderius Erasmus, a Catholic, connects this order to Christ in his Ciceronianus, or Dialogue
on the Best Style of Speaking (1528): “Are not all our actions gauged by the rules of Christ from
which if our speech departs we shall neither be good orators nor good men?” (66). He also
names the circumstances of the speech situation. A decorous approach, Erasmus says, takes into
account all the circumstances: “True propriety” is based “partly from the subject, partly from the
character of the speaker and the listener, partly from place, time, and other circumstances”
(58).41 Likewise, Juan Luis Vives, another Catholic, delineates in great detail the various

40 “Διδασκαλικόν [(Didaskalikón)] seu doctrinale [genus] monstrat rationem tractandi omnes

res, de quibus alii docendi sunt.”
41 For similar lists, see Wilson (2, 10, 20-22, 114, 121,, 122) and Erasmus, Day, and
Puttenham (as qtd. in Christiansen 124-125).
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circumstances of a speech situation and aspects of audience in his chapter on decorum in his
rhetoric textbook De ratione dicendi (1532).42 Vives lists subject matter, persons, place, and
time as the major aspects of the communicative situation (755).43 He then lists other
considerations that fall under these headings; for example, under the heading of speaker, he lists
“age, profession or livelihood, dignity,” and then subdivides these as well (755).44 Vives
includes similar subdivisions for subject matter (755), speaker (755-758), audience (758-761),
place (761-762), and time (762). Also, the concern for audience is expanded upon with attention
to the various ways in which an audience can be understood. As Erasmus explains in
Ecclesiastes (1525), his preaching manual, one should “reflect [on] how much variety of sex,
age, condition, intelligence, opinion, lifestyle, [and] custom exists within the same population” to
truly understand the people one preaches to (280).
Because Humanists emphasize performance in accordance with God’s order, with
circumstances, and with audience, they establish these aspects of communication as a basis for
determining respectful discourse and conduct.45 Wilson says that the present occasion teaches us
to compose in some ways even better than training in the art of rhetoric (Arte of Rhetorique 124).
This attention to circumstances enables critical reading of the situation-- to what the time and
place dictate should be included in and excluded from a speech (22). When one reads the
situation in this way and gains experience in responding to the situation, one develops good
judgment. One is

42 As Mack reminds us, Vives’ longest chapter in De ratione dicendi is on decorum

(“Ratione” 84).
43 “...a la materia, a las personas, al lugar y al tiempo.” See also Mack, “Contributions,” 238246, 263, for a discussion of such lists in De ratione dicendi, De conscribendis epistolis, and De
consultatione.
44 “En el dicente consideremos la edad, la profesión o manera de vida, la dignidad.”
45 See Christiansen 104.
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able to make himself a Rhetorique for euery matter, will not be bound to any
precise rules, nor keepe any one order, but such onely as by reason he shall thinke
best to vse, being master ouer arte, rather then arte should be maister ouer him,
rather making arte by wit, then confounding wit by arte. (181)
Similarly, Erasmus also adds that this propriety is a matter of “judgment,” and that one should
consider “with what discrimination” an interlocutor speaks, using St. Paul, a Christian orator, as
an example of someone who “adapts himself to every circumstance” (Ecclesiastes 278). Vives
calls decorum “the principal part of [rhetoric]” which is to be found “in the experience of life,
sifted by keen judgment and prudence” (De ratione dicendi 690).46 By using these rhetorical
heuristics, one is able to determine how to both speak and behave well. As Wilson puts it, “the
wicked can not speake euill” (Arte of Rhetorique 256). In Ciceronianus, Erasmus says, that
eloquence “[has] the end in view not only to speak with greater polish but to live better” (116).
Vives, too, asserts that decorum applies both to rhetoric and to life (De ratione dicendi 755).47
Erasmus also goes beyond Cicero and adds the Christian concept of charity to decorum, noting
that “Christian charity considers everywhere what is appropriate to each” (Ecclesiastes 629).
Also, when a preacher must chastise his people, he should be temperate and sincere: he should
“temper his censure in such a way that he shows that he resorts to it against his will and is not
pursuing his own interest but is moved by the danger of those whom he sincerely wishes well out
of his charity” (1014).48
With decorum on their minds, the Humanists criticize the violent tendencies of Scholastic
dialectic. A classicist who focuses on Renaissance Humanism, Erika Rummel, in her often-cited

46 “. . . Y el decoro-- del cual se dice constituye el primer capítulo del arte-- ¿adónde se irá
buscar sino en la experiencia de la vida, cribada por un juicio agudo y prudente?”
47 “. . . no tanto es propio de esa disciplina como de la vida toda”
48 See also Remer 76-79 for a discussion of Erasmus’ Christianization of decorum.
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The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and Reformation, describes the Humanists’
distaste for the Scholastics’
excessive reliance on Aristotle; the separation of rhetoric from dialectic and the
exaggerated attention given to formal proof at the expense of other modes of
inference; and the use of technical jargon accessible only to a narrow clique of
professionals. (153)
She reviews how Valla, Agricola, Vives, Melanchthon, Ramus, and Nizolius seek to remedy
each of these weaknesses of Scholastic dialectic (153-192). In relation to the Humanists’
rhetoricization of dialectic (156-183), Rummel discusses how each of these Humanists believes
that dialectic and rhetoric use the same “methods of argumentation” (168) and perform different
“tasks of the orator,” rather than divide these tasks between philosophers and orators (169).
Rummel also outlines how each of these Humanists criticizes the “low potential for application
to life” of Scholastic dialectic on three fronts: “the role of dialectic in moral decision-making; the
related question of its role in the curriculum for theology students; and the propaedeutic nature of
dialectics, which suggest that the time allotted to it should be curtailed” (183). Rummel explains
that these concerns were driven by the Humanists’ belief that the educational value of dialectic
should displace any combative value thereof: “If the purpose [of dialectic] was moral education
and edification, there was no room for a spirit of contentiousness” (183). Rummel also explains
that Agricola, Vives, and Melanchthon all emphasize the educational value of dialectic. Rummel
notes that Agricola “wanted the disputant to be a concerned teacher rather than a competitive
wrangler” (183). Vives believed that “The specious reasoning taught at Paris had no practical
use and could not be employed in everyday conversation” (184). Melanchthon, too, “enriches
his textbook on dialectic with examples that will edify as well as instruct the student” (185) and

Leon 26
implores students to recall the proper function of dialectic, to find truth (187). Rummel,
however, does not connect these educational concerns to decorum.
Although Rummel does not connect these educational concerns to decorum, the
discussions of Vives, Erasmus, and Guazzo on the violence of Scholastic dialectic and their
proposed solutions to this violence emphasize the importance of decorum in disputation. Vives
is concerned that dialectical disputations become a matter of display and sophistry rather than
pursuit of truth. In Against the Pseudodialecticans (1520), Vives expresses his distaste with the
“shallow word-play” of logicians at the University of Paris (49). He calls for the necessity to
check one’s passions so as to rather “rely on your reason, hear all these opinions with unbiased
ears and mind, and refrain from judgment or decision, whether spoken or silent, until the very
end” of a disputation (51). He also is concerned that disputants turn to shouting and become “the
most clamorous, the most loquacious in the fever-pitch of the schools, whose life would fail
them sooner than their voice” (93). In On the Causes of the Corruption of the Arts (1531), he
adds that such disputants “look for certain thorny questions suited for debate, which will supply
abundant material for contention, and they spin out their wrangling endlessly even in teaching
precepts of the art” (trans. Guerlac 145). In order to win the favor of onlookers, disputants even
conjure “up ludicrous things as if in a play, and with the same lofty and empty style” (147). The
resultant “Display” begins to look less like the mutual search for truth a disputation should be
and more like mere crowd pleasing for one’s own personal benefit (147). “And so these things,”
Vives warns, “do not sharpen the wit, but encourage it to run wild, and the thorns make it
contentious and captious instead of animated and active in pursuit of worthy things” (151).
Erasmus criticizes Scholastic disputations because they lack decorum. In Praise of Folly
(1511), Erasmus writes against current social practices and comments on education and the
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Church. He satirically suggests that logic would have no use if there were no contention, if
“there was no bickering about the double-meaning of words” (26). He uses the battle metaphor
for disputation, suggesting that some teach grammar “as if it were a matter to be decided by the
sword if a man made an adverb of a conjunction” (41). What is more, the “most subtle subtleties
are rendered yet more subtle by the several methods of so many Schoolmen” (45). All of these
subtleties are merely “noise” (51) and “ridiculous trifles” (53). Erasmus also suggests that a
dialectical approach may lead to anger, which leads to the reasoning that heretics ought “to be
convinced by fire rather than reclaimed by argument” (64). Reformation scholar Gary Remer
explains that Erasmus sees such violence as an issue of decorum: “From Erasmus’s perspective,
the scholastics’ neglect of decorum increased the likelihood of verbal intolerance. . . . the
scholastics viewed heretics as either malicious or insane” (99). In Ecclesiastes, Erasmus more
directly critiques dialectic for its lack of decorum, particularly when dialectic is used in
preaching. In giving his recommendations for the best art of preaching, Erasmus suggests that
dialectic “seems even to compel and to drag a man by force, as though bound in chains, to its
own point of view. But who would trust a schemer, and how few would not rather be led than
dragged?” (468).49 In this passage, Erasmus shows his concern over the coercive potential of
treating preaching like a disputation, which disregards the listeners’ ability to reason for
themselves. Dialectic should not be simply “devised for displaying [one’s] own learning” (469).
The preacher has to be careful to have a better goal in mind, lest dialectic turn into “useless
complications and riddles” (469).
Likewise, Stefano Guazzo disagrees with philosophers who are overly contentious. In
The Civil Conversation (1574), Book 1, Guazzo writes against the sophistry of philosophers who

49 See also Remer 48 for other instances where Erasmus expresses preference for persuasion over
force.
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focus on being contradictory at the expense of truth: “And I see you Philosophers dispute and
argue one against another, and holde singuler opinions farre from the trueth” (40). He compares
these philosophers to unconscionable heretics:
the vice of contradiction is proper to men of small discretion: who oppugne the
trueth, either of ignorance, or of obstinacie: and they are like to Heretikes, who
being conuicted by inuincible reasons, yet will yeelde nothing at all, but reply still
to the contrarie. (40)
He also adds that such sophisters will, when their opponent refuses to follow their argument,
resort to verbal attacks: “when they are able to mainteine Argument no longer by any reason,
they enter into a chafe, and seeke to get the vpper hande by outcries, swearing, threatning, and
arrogant demeanor” (40).
Humanists, therefore, suggest methods for bringing respectful discourse to the dialectical
disputation. Vives’ solution for display dialectic is to limit the actual use of disputation by
making most disputation internal--with oneself-- and by emphasizing and adding to Aristotle’s
rules. To remedy the violent situation dialectic falls into, Vives, in his treatise De Disputatione
(1523) first distinguishes “the quiet and authentic disputation of each inside himself,” or internal
disputation, from “the tight, comparative disputation,” or external disputation.50 The internal
disputation is where violence can be minimal, because what one says to oneself will be more
readily accepted: “what teaches shows, rather than obligates” (832).51 As Renaissance rhetoric
scholar Peter Mack points out, Vives shows preference for the internal disputation
(“Contributions” 235). This preference shows when Vives laments that he must also discuss

50 “la callada y auténtica diputación de cada uno consigo mismo” . . . “la diputación trabada y

comparada”. . .
51 “Por esto, para persuadir quien no resiste, sino que sigue dócilmente, el mejor
procedimiento es éste, porque a la vez que enseña demuestra, más que no obliga”
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external disputation: “it seems to me that I am obligated to say a few words on this thing we call
dispute or altercation” (837).52 By making this distinction, Vives makes an effort to distance
his dialectic from possible contention by limiting the preferred dialectic to a mental practice
rather than a school or a public practice. Accepting Aristotle’s first rule for disputation, Vives
also reminds those who would hold an external disputation that they should keep their object in
mind rather than descend to “shots and volleys” (837).53 In disputation, one should focus on the
acquisition of truth, as Aristotle recommended, rather than the pursuit of honor. If such is the
case, defeat will mean freedom from ignorance rather than continued “decepción” (838). Vives
also adds a rule: one should advocate cool heads over raised voices to the exclusion of
contentious individuals from participation in disputation. Because those who get heated “impede
all sight” of the truth, they should not participate in disputation at all: “This is why the bilious,
the passionate, the irritable, the seekers of vainglory are no good for disputation, especially
against a sly sophist, for easily they become inflamed and blind” (837-838).54 It is Vives’ hope
that by limiting external disputations and making suggestions for how to perform them with the
correct end in mind and in a dispassionate manner, disputations will proceed in a more decorous
fashion. Also, in De ratione dicendi, Vives mentions another rule for this “familiar and private
discussion”: a disputation should be “simple, direct, natural, without packing or emphasis, but
rather naked, always without being ordinary or low” (762).55 Through these recommendations-limit external disputations in favor of internal disputations, keep the goal of truth in sight, and
use clear, non-convoluted language— Vives encourages decorous disputation.
52 “paréceme que estoy obligado a decir unas palabras de esta llamémosla disputa o altercado”
53 “tiros a voleo”

54 “impiden toda videncia. . . . Por eso es que los biliosos, los apasionados, los irritables,
los captadores de gloria vana, no sirven para la disputa, singularmente contra un sofista
ladino, pues con facilidad se encienden y se ciegan.” See also Mack, “Contributions” 236.
55 “La pláctica familiar y privada debe ser sencilla, directa, natural, sin empaque ni énfasis, más
bien desnuda, siempre que fuere ordinaria o raez.”
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Erasmus takes a different approach, emphasizing various rules that call for a friendlier
disputation. One of Erasmus’ rules is that a disputation should be conversational. As Remer
observes, Erasmus “recognizes the distinctive characteristics of sermo” and “distinguishes
sermo. . . in his essay on letter writing” as a genre which “‘should resemble a conversation
between friends’” rather than opponents (87). In giving examples of the “‘disputatoriae genus’”
of letters, Remer points out that Erasmus uses examples from Cicero and the humanist Angelo
Poliziano, examples that employ appropriate, decorous language even in discussion of
philosophical matters (88-89). Remer also draws attention to the ways in which Erasmus’s
Diatribe sive collatio de libero arbitrio (1524), a letter framed as a turn taken in a disputation,
skirts “passions and contention” (95). Remer notes that Erasmus is not completely opposed to
Scholastic disputations, “so long as they [are] conducted with decorum” (98). Also commenting
on De libero arbitrio, Weijers points to four other rules Erasmus uses as he makes an effort to
write with decorum. Erasmus
1) reasserts the Scholastic rule that the disputation should be moderate: “‘by too
much altercation often the truth is lost’”
2) says he has no desire to be confrontational
3) does not reference his opponent, the reformer Martin Luther, directly
4) does not end with a Scholastic conclusion or direct refutation of the arguments he
is writing against (Disputation Techniques 192-193)
Guazzo makes dialectical disputation courteous by recasting disputation as a friendly
discussion. Guazzo explains some of the “boundes and limites prescribed” for disputation (40)
and “how wee should behaue ourselues with these ouerthwart persons” (41). He specifically
concentrates on how to conduct oneself when a friend will not listen to reason, saying that one
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should then step back from the matter and appeal to the better part of the friend: “When you
perceiue your selfe to preuaile nothing by reasoning with your friende, & that there is doubt of
some disorder, you ought rather to bowe then to breake, feeding his humor. . . beare with his
imperfection” (41). He notes that one should proceed “in gentle maner, without scoffing” (41).
Guazzo leaves disputatio for sermo, emphasizing numerous aspects of the eponymous civil
conversation. In Book 2, he includes other rules, such as pay attention to the natures and
behaviors of others (“the natures, manners, and dooings of others”), avoid extremes (“wee
offende eyther by arrogancie, or by distrust, you may consequentlie perceiuve, that the remedie
which you seeke to flye those extreemes, and to follow the meane, is ciuile conuersation”), and
respect the social status and identities of others (“ciuile conuersation ought to varie according to
the varietie of the persons. . . differing in sexe, in age, in degree, in conditions, in country, and in
nation” (4). Vives, Erasmus, and Guazzo, as well as the Humanists cited by Rummel, reflect a
movement to bring aspects of decorum from rhetoric to dialectic.
As consequence of these various teachings and recommendations, the Humanists apply
decorum to disputation. While Erika Rummel and other Renaissance scholars do not tie these
developments in the Renaissance disputation to decorum, clearly all of these matters reflect
concerns for appropriate conduct in disputations. One way in which the Humanists apply
decorum to disputation is by using looser structures and by including courtesies in their writings.
Rummel says that rather than perpetuate “the scholastic method of inquiry,” the Humanists
instead “employ[] a less structured approach, with a rhetorical thrust” and follow the
recommendations of their rhetorical handbooks “to refrain from unduly long, technical, and
complex argumentation” (2-3). As a result, Humanist dialogues, for example, tend “to terminate
the argument with civilities: the polite and perfunctory agreement of the participants in a
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dialogue or, in the case of an epistle, polite deference to the opinion of the author’s addressee”
(3). Decorum is also applied by mimicking aspects of real conversation and showing character
through other discourse features. The linguist Irma Taavitsainen contrasts what she calls the
“mimetic dialogues” of the Early Modern period with “scholastic dialogues” (243). Taavitsainen
compares these forms of dialogue without tracing the mimetic dialogue to the Humanists, but
since the Humanists stress decorum more than the Scholastics do, it is safe to assume that the
mimetic dialogue is the more Humanistic dialogue. Taavitsainen points out that Scholastic
dialogues contain “features typical of questions-literature and the scholastic thought-style” (247).
Early Modern scholastic dialogues, including didactic forms such as the catechism, as linguists
Jonathan Culpeper and Merja Kytö explain, are
dominated by answers. . . . Instructional Handbooks or Treatises present
arguments or information in answers to questions posed by some ignorant or
misguided person. Answers have the linguistic trappings of authority. . . . The
depersonalization of scholastic dialogues. . . obviously inhibits characterization.
(44)
The mimetic dialogue, however, irrespective of subject matter (Taavitsainen, for example,
discusses medical writing), “achieve[s] a conversational tone with features of spoken language
such as responses to previous turns, follow-up questions, pragmatic particles, etc. . . . or
[questions] may be posed more indirectly with various degrees of politeness” (Taavitsainen 260).
She concludes that the mimetic dialogue
assume[s] an entertaining function. . . . Features of natural conversation are
present in some dialogues that incorporate speech acts of normal everyday
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conversation, like apologies, insults, greetings and leave-takings, and other
exchanges that belong to personal communication. (262-263)
Culpeper and Kytö also add that the mimetic dialogue will contain other “interpersonal linguistic
items,” such as “politeness formulae, terms of address, repetitions, exclamations, [and] rhetorical
questions” (44). In other words, the Humanists emphasize that dialogues ought to apply
decorum. Other Humanist transformations of the disputation genre include, as Mack explains,
the development of opening statements that resemble rhetorical declamations (58-61), and, as
Weijers explains, the use of less “unorthodox doubt, sophisms, and personal attacks on the
adversary” than Scholastic disputations (Disputation Techniques 191).56 A specialist in
Renaissance rhetoric in Galileo’s work, Jean Dietz Moss explains that “The medieval
disputation”-- or Scholastic disputation-- “was transformed into a humanized version in which
rigorous arguments were interwoven with oratorical appeals and presented-- often as dialogue-to general as well as academic readers and hearers” (686).
The Jesuits, like their fellow Humanists, rely on Cicero’s understanding of the union of
dialectic and rhetoric and, because rhetoric provides a broader theory of respectful discourse than
dialectic, revise dialectical disputation by inserting rhetorical concepts stemming from decorum.
The Jesuits accept Cicero’s explanation of the union of dialectic and rhetoric. Cyprian Soarez, in
De Arte Rhetorica Libri III (1568), sees the inseparability and relationship between dialectic and
rhetoric, between reason and speech.57 For example, he shares a metaphor in which reason is a
“light which gives brightness and life” and speech is the “glory and ornament of reason”-- that is
to say, one leads into the other (110).58 He also says that rhetoric covers all subjects: “speaking

56 See also 189-191, 200-203.
57 See also Flynn, “Sources” 258; Christiansen 72, 110; Farrell, Code 356-359; Conley 153154. 58 “ratio est sicuti lux quaedam, lumenque vite: oratio est rationis decus, & ornamentum:
ratio regit, ac moderatur proprium animum: oratio flectit etiam alienos: rationis est species

Leon 34
well. . . has no distinct field within the boundaries of which it is confined. Any subject men are
able to discuss must be spoken well by the man who claims to be able to do it” (120-121).59
The Jesuits use Cicero’s theory of decorum, and also an additional Christian emphasis on
charity. Soarez, like his Humanist contemporaries and echoing Cicero (Orator 21.7122.72),
explains that one should speak in the context of all the circumstances:
It also makes a great difference what the personality is of the one who speaks and
the personalities of those who listen. Not every fate, not every dignity, not all
authority; nor every age, place, time, or hearer is to be treated with the same kind
of words and thoughts. In each instance, we must determine to what extent.
Although each person has his own peculiar style, nevertheless, too much is more
displeasing than too little; so, as wisdom is the foundation of eloquence even as it
is of the remaining matters, it is the foundation of style. (416)60
Audience is also considered from the perspective of the circumstances, especially with
regard for the truthfulness of an approach that respects the reasoning capacity of an audience. In
the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, Ignatius seeks to differentiate the Jesuits from the
Scholastics by explicitly calling for a method of preaching that is “different from the scholastic
manner,” that takes into consideration the circumstances (402). In order to depart from the

admirabilis, eam tamen intus latentem orationis pulchritudo declarat. Ita quod lumen est soli
principi, ac moderatori luminum reliquorum, id est, oratio rationi dominę, ac reginae rerum
omnium” (Libri A4). English translations are based on Flynn (De Arte) and on recommendations
from Grant Boswell.
59 "ornate dicere, non habet definitam aliquam regionem, cuius terminis septa teneatur. Omnia
quaecumque in hominum disceptationem cadere possunt, bene sunt. . . dicenda, qui hoc se posse
profitetur" (Libri 2). See also Christiansen 102, 104.
60 “Multum etiam refert, quae sit persona eius, qui dicit; & eorum, qui audiunt. Non.n [sic]
omnis fortuna, non omnis honos, non omnis auctoritas, non omnis aetas: nec vero locus, aut
tempus aut auditor omnis eodem aut verborum genere tractandus est, aut sententiarum. In
omnibus etiam rebus videndum est quatenus. . . . vnde sit ut eloquentiae, sicut reliquarum rerum,
fundamentum sit sapientia” (Libri 82). See also Christiansen 129.
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“scholastic manner,” priests must learn the language of the people, considering places and times,
and seek to “avail themselves of all appropriate means to perform [their ministry] better”
(402).61 One circumstance of import is that of audience. Ignatius writes that priests should learn
how to teach Christian doctrine in such a way that all people will be capable of understanding it.
Priests should “adapt[] themselves to the capacities of children or simple persons” (203).62
Similarly, in the Spiritual Exercises he encourages a Christian effort to lovingly reason with
others. In the preface of this manual, Ignatius writes that
it must be presupposed that every good Christian should be readier to excuse than
to condemn a proposition advanced by his neighbor; and if he cannot justify it; let
him enquire into the meaning of the author: if the latter be in error, correct him
lovingly; should that not suffice, then let him employ every suitable means, so
that his neighbor, rightly understanding it, may be saved from error. (1)63
Soarez also comments on decorum when he calls for a truthful Christian approach to discourse.
This approach should, for example, eschew lying, and should “check all boldness and disgraceful
fault of tearing others to pieces by infamous, insulting, and abusive language” (Rhetorica 113).64
Furthermore, pride and crowd-pleasing have no place in Christian discourse:

61 See also Schloesser 360.
62 See also O’Malley 38; Muller 466; Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises 11, 96, 216.

63 “se ha de presuponer, que todo buen Cristiano ha de ser mas pronto a salvar la proposicion

del proximo, que a condenarla: y si no la puede salvar, inquira como la entiende; y si mal la
entiende, corrijale con amor; y si no basta, busque todos los medios convenientes para que bien
entendiendola se salve” (15). See also Maryks 81; Fumaroli 95; Modras 115. Lancashire and
Kuo-chen specifically refer to this passage in their discussion of True Meaning as a “‘preparation
for the Gospel’” which discusses Christianity from the standpoint of reason rather than
revelation, considering that “Ricci found himself writing for Confucian scholars who were totally
lacking in any knowledge of the tenets of Christianity, and who therefore could not easily discuss
anything like God’s revelation of himself in history” (12).
64 “amputetur procacitas, & vitium illud teterrimum lacerandi alios probris, contumelus
maledictis” (Libri A5).
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Let arrogance and an appetite for vain praise be cut back, for him who dazzles the
keenness of mind. Let it be understood that it is wicked to envelop an audience in
darkness so that they do not perceive the truth by speaking, an occurrence done to
corrupt their decisions and their thinking, time and again by Greek and Roman
orators. (113-114)65
In each case, the Jesuits are teaching the need to contextualize one’s argument through attention
to the circumstances— in particular the reasoning capacity of the audience— and through being
truthful rather than misleading.
While it is generally understood that Jesuit rhetoric is Ciceronian and Humanist, some
scholars believe that Jesuit Humanist rhetoric is at odds with their training in Scholastic
dialectical disputation. Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes apparent that the Humanist
concern for decorum influences how the Jesuits think of disputation. Rhetoric and composition
scholars Kristine Johnson and Paul Lynch suggest that Jesuit rhetoric is more significantly
influenced by Scholastic dialectic than Humanist rhetoric. Johnson and Lynch draw attention to
the fact that Jesuit pedagogy was influenced “by the curricular framework of the medieval
universities the Jesuits themselves attended” (100), where Ciceronian curriculum “vied with
Aquinas-inspired Parisian scholasticism” (101). They stress that the use of dialectical
disputations led to agonism in the classroom: “In Jesuit pedagogy Ciceronian humanism
competed with the modus parisiensis-- the scholastic style of learning prevalent in Paris” (a
major center of Scholasticism during the Renaissance) “since the thirteenth century” (106). They
also cite historian of education Allan Farrell’s history of the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum (1599) or

65 “resecetur arrogantia, & inanis laudis appetitus, qui aciem animi perstringit, intelligatur

iniquum esse tenebras auditoribus offundere, ne verum perspiciant, et suffragium, atque
sententiam dicendo corrumpere, quod a Graecis, & Romanis Oratoribus est factitatum” (Libri
A5). See also Christiansen 113-114.
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plan of studies and the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus as evidence of how disputations were
to be found at all levels of Jesuit education (106). From “The Rules for the Professor of
Rhetoric” in the Ratio Studiorum, Johnson and Lynch also consider rhetorical declamations or
speeches as evidence that dialectical disputation had worked its way into the curriculum (107108). While they recognize that such competitions also have antecedents in Quintilian’s
Institutio Oratoria, where Quintilian encourages emulation and competitions to enliven students,
Johnson and Lynch still believe that it was rather the presence of disputation which led to
residual “medieval agonism” in Jesuit rhetoric (109). However, Johnson and Lynch do not
pursue further ways in which Jesuit disputations were distinct from and/or influenced by their
interaction with Renaissance Humanist rhetoric, nor do they seek to account for how these
distinctions and interactions would play out in the mission field. Instead, Johnson and Lynch
merely rely on Farrell’s research as the crux of their argument. Farrell, however, merely states
that the modo et ordo Parisiensis for the Jesuits meant that Jesuit schools were strictly
regimented and involved many exercises (Farrell, Code 30-35).66 He says nothing about
requiring disputations to proceed in a Scholastic manner, as Lynch and Johnson claim, but only
that Ignatius was inspired by the curriculum at the Sainte-Barbe College of the University of
Paris, a curriculum that balanced dialectic and rhetoric, instead of neglecting of rhetoric as the
other colleges did (31).
Contrary to Johnson and Lynch, the Jesuits actually take up many of the concerns of the
Humanists and adapt their pedagogy of dialectical disputation accordingly by applying rhetorical
principles of decorum to dialectic. For example, the Ratio Studiorum suggests that the defendant

66 See also O’Malley 215-227. Rummel, in a discussion of Humanists versus Scholastics,

notes that there was indeed a modus Parisiensis in regards to dialectic in Scholastic theology
(60).
Farrell, however, does not discuss dialectic as being the particular aspect of the Parisian
curriculum that attracted the early Jesuits.
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in the disputation should explain the thesis in a “theological form but with a certain elegance of
style,” where style is typically the domain of rhetoric, not dialectic (22). Elsewhere, there is a
note that the disputants should involve “scholastic formalities” in the process (38), but students
should also engage in “honorable rivalry” rather than contentious argument (68). Formal
disputations are to have a “certain degree of ceremony,” and classroom disputations can proceed
in “an oratorical rather than a dialectical style” (108, 110). The insistence on rhetorical decorum
in the form of respect and oratorical style remains significant in the Jesuit curriculum. Even in
the “Rules for the Professor of Higher Faculties,” the professor is counseled to respectfully
engage opponents. He should
defend his view with such modesty and courtesy as to show respect for the
contrary view, the more so if it was held by his predecessor. When it is possible to
reconcile diverse views, an attempt should be made to do so. He should express
himself temperately in naming or refuting authors (26).
Additionally, while the Ratio recommends that professors “enliven the discussions” of students
by inviting objecting propositions, it also recommends that they should not cut off another
speaker: professors “should not urge an objection while the appointed objector is still arguing his
point with vigor and effect” (28). In other words, the Ratio presents a unique adaptation of the
Scholastic disputatio that takes into account the circumstances in which the disputation takes
place, and recommends strategies to promote goodwill among disputants. In all of these
instructions for disputations, there is an emphasis on the proper time, place, and persons involved
in dialectical disputations. Ricci, having been taught with this curriculum, would have been
trained in respectful debate and informed not only in dialectic and rhetoric, but also by a concern
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for a decorum which is more in line with the rhetorical tradition of the Humanist rhetoricians
than the dialectical tradition of the Scholastics.

Matteo Ricci
In True Meaning, Matteo Ricci follows the Ciceronian and Humanist understanding of
the connection between the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric—that philosophy and rhetoric
both meet in sermo, and that rules of rhetoric can be applied to dialectic—, and this
understanding leads Ricci to outline and exemplify a theory of respectful discourse. Ricci
believes that philosophy goes hand in hand with rhetoric. Ricci illustrates this relationship by
hearkening back to Soarez’ light metaphor that places reason in the position of the main light:
Reason stands in relation to man as the sun to the world, shedding its light
everywhere. To abandon principles affirmed by the intellect and to comply with
the opinions of others is like shutting out the light of the sun and searching for an
object with a lantern. (1.25)67
Also, Ricci believes that reason ought to be man’s guiding principle because it can reveal truth
by combating falsehood: “it is better still to use clear reasoning than to refute them merely with
many words” (2.69). Furthermore, good speech depends on good reasoning: “Words and facts
must accord with each other before they can be believed” (4.218). Virtues will likewise be
perfected in righteous action (“Virtuous conduct added to goodness is the expression [of that
goodness]” [7.432]), a sentiment also found in Cicero (“the whole glory of virtue is in activity”
[On Duties 1.6.19]).

67 In the footnote to this section, Meynard notes that Ricci bases this statement on his

predecessor’s catechism, which states “Ratio est veluti lux, qua very notiam percipimus,
quamquam dignoscimus, sitne verum, an falsum [. . .], ut quod ratio falsum esse demonstrate,
intellectus ut verum iudicare non possit”.
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Consequently, Ricci has a theory of respectful discourse that includes Aristotle’s
emphasis on common purpose, but also considers the aforementioned aspects of decorum
described by Cicero and the Humanists. Ricci uses Aristotle’s common purpose rule to show
that the purpose of a discussion ought to be the mutual search for truth, but not by just any
means. Through the mouth of the Chinese Scholar, Ricci notes that the search for truth should
be foremost in the minds of interlocutors: “in any discussion it is essential to put truth above all
else…. The superior man makes truth his standard. Where truth is to be found, he will comply
with it, but where there is no truth, he will oppose it” (1.27). However, Ricci departs from
Aristotle by insisting that one should respect an opponent’s ability to reason by using clarity
rather than misdirection and trickery. He believes that reason is more persuasive than force, like
Cicero and the Humanists assert: “The truth can subdue men’s minds more readily than a
sharpened sword” (8.551). Also, at the beginning of their encounter, Ricci invites the Chinese
Scholar to challenge his reasoning as the Chinese Scholar sees fit:
Should you find any proposition unacceptable, I hope you will dispute it and not
deceive me in any way. Because we are discussing the universal principles of the
Lord of Heaven, I cannot permit personal modesty to stand in the way of the truth.
(1.26; see also 7.446)
Later, Ricci shows trust in the reasoning abilities of his interlocutor by stating that the Chinese
Scholar will be able to intuit the truth from what little has been taught: “Without any effort on
my part you are able to infer much from the little you have heard” (1.64). Ricci even invites
others to study on their own after a disputation rather than just stop learning after the disputation
is over: “After one has studied and learned by mutual discussion, one must go on to refine one’s
knowledge through the hard grind of further study” (6.365); “I hope that those who practice the
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Way will go home and savor the teachings I have propounded in the several foregoing chapters”
(8.594).
This trust in the ability of the Chinese Scholar to reason is also reflected in Ricci’s
inclusion of the kinds of questions that the Chinese Scholar asks. For example, when Ricci
explains that all things have an origin and God is that origin, the Chinese Scholar asks, "Since
you, Sir, say that the Lord of Heaven is the beginning of all things, may I ask by whom the Lord
of Heaven was produced?" (1.41). This question logically follows from what Ricci has been
setting forth, and the very fact that Ricci includes such a question hints at his desire to portray
the Chinese Scholar in a realistic rather than idealized manner. Ricci also includes the Chinese
Scholar’s protest against Ricci’s attack on Buddha, showing how not everything that Ricci
teaches is immediately taken as truth: “The Buddha is not inferior to the Sovereign on High. . . .
There is much that one can learn from him” (4.210). Another question, “Are you trying to say
that the sages were ignorant of this teaching? Why is it concealed and not mentioned?” (6.389),
expresses concern about Ricci’s estimation of the wisdom of some of the ancients. The Chinese
Scholar even brings up a question about celibacy, asking “in our canonical writings there is the
statement: ‘There are three things which mark a man as being unfilial, and the greatest of these is
to have no progeny.’ What have you to say about that?” (8.551). Through these and other
inquiries, Ricci shows an opponent who is not a complete yes-man, one who simply accepts
every argument put to him. Ricci does not shun from reflecting questions that may arise from
the uniqueness of his message. This move shows a concern for his audience as real people with
real questions that do not need to be ignored in the process of writing a persuasive argument-and Ricci makes no pretense to trick his opponent; rather, he is open and sensitive to the
potential concerns his opponent may have.
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Ricci especially goes further than Aristotle by emphasizing the Christian concept of
charity based on recognition of difference. Traditionally, love for others or friendship depends
on similarity and proximity. For example, in On Friendship, Ricci repeats a popular maxim on
similarity from Aristotle, Cicero, and Augustine: “My friend is not an other, but half of myself,
and thus a second me-- I must therefore regard my friend as myself” (91). Cicero also says that
one should principally befriend those who are similar to oneself (“What is sweeter than to have
someone with whom you may dare discuss anything as if you were communing with yourself?”
[On Friendship 6.22]; “For everyone loves himself. . . the real friend. . . as it were, [is] another
self” [21.80]; “Nothing. . . is more conducive to love and intimacy than compatibility of
character in good men” [On Duties 1.17.56]), and those who are more closely related to oneself
(“between us all there exists a certain tie which strengthens with our proximity to each other”
[On Friendship 5.19]; “The interests of society. . . and its common bonds will be best conserved,
if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of his relationship” [On
Duties 1.16.50]). In True Meaning, however, Ricci departs from both Aristotle and Cicero by
suggesting that respectful behavior is based more on recognition of differences between people.
While refuting the notion that we should love others because they are made of the same spiritual
substance as ourselves, Ricci says that “there must be at least two persons for humanity and
righteousness to operate” (4.245). Building on this distinction, Ricci asserts that true humanity
depends on a recognition of how others differ from oneself:
Humanity is the extension of one’s own feelings toward others; righteousness is
the treatment of the old with respect and honor; but in both cases there must be a
distinction between oneself and others. If there is no distinction between oneself
and others, there can be no principles of humanity and righteousness. If you say
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that all things are you, then humanity and righteousness will be equivalent to selflove and self-service; you will become an inferior man who is only aware of
himself and knows nothing of anyone else, and who is aware of humanity and
righteousness only as names. (4.246)
In other words, a recognition of the unique qualities of one’s fellow men is essential to
developing respect for others. Moreover, it is only through this recognition of difference that
one can live up to the Christian call to do more than “love them which love you” (Matthew
5:46): the superior man “therefore has a duty to love and display compassion to all men. How
can he be like the inferior man who merely loves his own kindred?” (True Meaning 4.248).
This love and compassion are Christian elements of respectful conduct and discourse
which lead one to speak with and behave appropriately toward others. Ricci, therefore, believes
that there is indeed a right way to behave (and, by extension, speak) with others, based on
attending to, rather than ignoring, differences. For example, Ricci portrays himself as a humble
teacher who may not know everything: At the very beginning, Ricci portrays the Chinese
Scholar coming to him to ask more about the Christian God. Ricci responds, “I am grateful for
your patronage, but I do not know what you wish to ask concerning the Lord of Heaven” (1.19).
Later, after citing Confucian literature, he expresses the possibility that he does not know
everything: “however, although I have not heard a complete explanation of the meaning of these
words, they would seem to be close to the truth” (2.67). He also says that a certain precept is “by
no means easy to explain,” again downgrading himself (2.102). Ricci also sees the Chinese
Scholar not as an enemy but as a friend, calling the Chinese Scholar by the epithet “my good
friend,” further identifying himself with him (3.127, 3.169). He also shows that he is working to
familiarize himself with the different philosophical arguments present in Chinese society (“There

Leon 44
are those who say” [3.149]) and that he is attentive to the words of the Chinese Scholar (“You
say that” [5.298]). Through these linguistic behaviors, Ricci concentrates his efforts to move his
audience through loving persuasion, rather than through the mere exposition of doctrine.
One other explanation for Ricci’s theory of respectful discourse in True Meaning is that
perhaps Ricci was influenced by Confucian teachings. What is more likely, however, is that
Ricci saw familiar Western concepts in the Confucian canon. As the sinologist Artur Wardega
explains, Ricci’s education colored what he saw when he came to China: “because of his
humanistic education, [Ricci] found himself much at home” in China (14) and “When, in the mid
1590s, he decided to dress like a Confucian scholar, Ricci not only followed the advice of his
friends but acted in harmony with his own philosophical and humanistic background” (15).68
Also, in discussing Confucius, Ricci mostly compares the sage with Western analogues rather
than with Confucius. For example, as Rule notes, Ricci considers Confucius “‘un altro Seneca’”
and the Confucian canon to include “‘many passages. . . which favour the teachings of our
faith’” (29). The closest Ricci comes to considering Confucius somehow a step above GrecoRoman philosophers is in regard to Confucianism’s possible congruencies with Christianity. For
example, Ricci calls Confucius “the equal of the pagan philosophers and superior to most of
them” (Journals 30). He likely makes this connection because Confucian ethical teachings are
“far from being contrary to Christian principles” (98).
Seeing Confucianism through the lens of Western traditions, Ricci likely saw similarities
in relation to teachings on Nature and circumstances, respect for an audience’s ability to reason,
and the use of courtesies. For example, Confucius teaches that attention to Nature will guide the
organization of appropriate relationships. In the Great Learning, Confucius asserts that the
“investigation of things” will lead to complete knowledge, sincere thought, appropriate behavior,
68 See also Wardega 16; Mungello 62.
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and social harmony (1.3-6). In the Book of Rites, Confucius also emphasizes attention to
circumstances, such as
the timeliness of instruction just when it was required; the suitability of the
lessons in adaptation to circumstances; and the good influence of example to
parties observing one another. The communication of lessons in an
undiscriminating manner and without suitability produces injury and disorder, and
fails in its object. (18.11)
Also, in discussions, contention is to be avoided: one should “not seek for victory in small
contentions” (1.3). At the same time, there is value in having discussions, as discussions help
one review and add to knowledge: "If a man keeps cherishing his old knowledge, so as
continually to be acquiring new, he may be a teacher of others” (Analects 2.11, also cited by
Ricci [True Meaning 7.459]). Respect for another’s ability to reason can be found in Mencius, in
which Confucius’ disciple Mencius emphasizes willing submission: “When one by force subdues
men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because their strength is not adequate to
resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts’ core they are pleased, and sincerely
submit” (2.3.2). Confucius is of the same opinion: “Leading and not dragging produces
harmony” (Book of Rites 18.9).69 There are also mentions of the need to show courtesy,
sincerity, and friendship. In order to be respectful, one might accentuate his or her lowliness:
“When the elder asks a question, to reply without acknowledging one’s incompetency and
(trying to) decline answering, is contrary to propriety” (Book of Rites 1.14). Also, inasmuch as
this discourse is sincere and not given to hyperbole, the discourse will be reverent: “Acts of the
greatest reverence admit of no ornament” (10.12). All of these teachings are based on sincerity,
because “Sincerity is the way of Heaven” (31.22). Likewise, as Confucius asserts in the
69 See also Analects 12.23.
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Analects, one should be careful not to offend, especially when in discussion with one’s friend:
“‘In serving a prince, frequent remonstrances lead to disgrace. Between friends, frequent
reproofs make the friendship distant’” (4.26). While these and other parts of Confucian
teachings may have had an impact on Ricci, there is no indication that he accepts teachings that
are distinct from Humanism and Christianity. Indeed, citing Ricci’s censure of syncretism, Rule
concludes that Ricci never fully accepts Confucianism as having equal weight with Christianity
(54).70 Because Ricci saw these teachings in the same light he saw pagan philosophers, Ricci
only takes from what is similar to Western traditions, not different. Ricci believes that there is a
‘“natural law’” that inspired Confucius, and that Christianity is more complete than
Confucianism in its teachings of that natural law (Lancashire, Kuo-chen, and Meynard 4). Ricci,
in fact, departs from Confucian doctrine where it does not fit with his understanding of Christian
doctrine. For example, Gernet points out that Ricci contradicts Mencius when he teaches that
one should love others not because they are similar to oneself but because of one’s choice to
love: “True goodness is dictated by reason. . . . Ricci was thus brought to contradict the theses of
Mencius” (155).71 Ricci sees similarities between Western and Confucian teachings, but does
not entirely adopt the Confucian paradigm.

As is evident from this comparison between the theory of respectful discourse found in
the Scholastic and Humanist curricula, Matteo Ricci’s True Meaning should more accurately be
viewed as a Humanist disputation rather than a Scholastic disputation. While the Scholastics
have a theory of respectful discourse by which to manage their disputations, the Humanists have
a much more substantial theory based in decorum that stresses attention to Nature and

70 See also Gernet 67.
71 See also 160-161.
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circumstances. When Ricci’s teachings and practice are considered from the perspective of
Renaissance rhetoric, the position of True Meaning in the history of the transformation of the
disputation genre becomes clear: in addition to translating Christian terms into Chinese and
referencing classical sources, Ricci explicitly teaches and practices decorum when writing his
disputation. This emphasis on decorum in disputation is evidence that the accommodation
strategy Ricci uses descends from the teachings of the Christian Humanists, not the Scholastics.
Further studies of Ricci should look to other ways in which he shows decorum in his writings,
and studies of how Ricci learned about Chinese culture through trial-and-error should look to
ways in which this process was affected by his understanding of decorum. Research into
Chinese influences on Ricci and the development of early modern disputations by the Jesuits and
others will also do well to consider the role of decorum in those influences and transformations.
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